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-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURAL POLICIES IN LIGHT OF
THE NO-REVIEW CLAUSE
Plato v. Roudebushl
Marion Plato, the wife of a World War II veteran, applied for veterans'
widows' benefits following her husband's death in 1973.2 Her application
was approved, and she began receiving monthly widows' benefits as of July
1, 1973. During the spring of 1974, the Veterans' Administration (VA)
learned, from a form completed by Mrs. Plato, that while separated from
her husband in 1962, she had given birth to a son by a man other than her
husband. On the basis of this information, the VA made a decision to
suspend her benefits.' On May 28, 1974, the VA notified Mrs. Plato by
letter that her benefits had been suspended effective June 1, 1974, pending
further investigation of her eligibility. The letter did not mention a hear-
ing, but it did inform her that she would have to submit various certified
statements by her and third persons to support any claim for further
benefits. 4 Mrs. Plato sued in federal court challenging the agency's failure
to provide her with a pretermination hearing as a violation of her constitu-
tional right to procedural due process. The VA contended that the court
did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim. The VA reasoned that 38
U.S.C. section 211(a)5 prohibited judicial review of a VA decision of any
question of law or fact under any law administered by the VA in providing
benefits. The agency further argued that the prohibition against review of
a question of law included review of the constitutionality of the VA hearing
procedure. The court held that section 211 (a) did not bar judicial review of
the constitutionality of the VA hearing procedures.
1. 397 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1975).
2. See 38 U.S.C. § 541 (1970).
3. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 541, 101(3), 103 (1970).
4. Plato was a class action. Robert Trail intervened as a named party plaintiff
and class representative along with Mrs. Plato. Mr. Trail was a veteran who had
been receiving a monthly pension for a non-service-connected disability. In De-
cember 1974, he was notified by letter that his disability pension would be sus-
pended or terminated soon because of the possibility that he was not married and
was receiving too large an income from outside sources. Mr. Trail requested a
hearing but he was not accorded a pre-suspension hearing.
5. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970).
1
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Section 211 (a), the "no-review" clause, provides that:
the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact
under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration pro-
viding benefits for veterans . . . shall be final and conclusive and
no. . . court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction
to review any such decision ...
To appreciate the significance of Plato, it is necessary to examine the
history surrounding and the purpose underlying the no-review clause. The
clause was adopted as a part of the Economy Act of 1933.6 It was designed
to give the executive complete control over the disposition of benefits. 7
Congress stated its purpose was twofold: (1) to insure veterans' benefits
claims would not burden the courts and the VA with expensive and time-
consuming litigation and (2) to insure that the technical and complex
determinations of agency policy connected with benefits decisions would be
adequately and uniformly made.8
The litigation history of the clause documents the courts' intent to
carry out this stated purpose. In 1934 the United States Supreme Court
established in Lynch v. United States9 that VA benefits were not rights but
mere gratuities. The Court reasoned that Congress could bar judicial
review because a gratuity did not rise to the level of a constitutionally
protected property right. The right/gratuity dichotomy was subsequently
rejected by the Supreme Court,10 but it was supplanted by another theory.
6. Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 9.
7. See Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional Problems
of "Positive" Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183 (1964). The Depression set the mood in
which the provision was adopted. Times were difficult and the country could not
afford to waste time and money quibbling over legal technicalities. So Congress
gave one man the final say. The fact that he might make a mistake was unimportant
because no one had the right to live off of the government. Id. at 188.
8. Hearings on H. R. 860, 478, 2442 & 6777 Before the Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1962-63 (1952). The House Report
on the 1970 amendment to the clause expressed a desire to keep the day-to-day
agency determinations out of the courts. H.R. REP. No. 91-1166, 91 Cong., 2d Sess.
101 (1970). Comparison of the Social Security Administration with the Veterans'
Administration indicates that the mischief the no-review clause was designed to
remedy may be just as effectively remedied by the type of limited review provided
in the Social Security Administration. See Morris, Judicial Review of Non-Reviewable
Administrative Action: Veterans Administration Benefits Claims, 29 AD. L. REV. 65
(1977).
9. 292 U.S. 571 (1934). Administrative lawlessness is condoned by labeling
the claimant's interest in a benefits program a mere gratuity, the right to which is
beyond constitutional protection. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960);
Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435 (1935); Slocumb v. Gray, 179 F.2d 31 (D.C.
Cir. 1949). The legislative history and litigation surrounding the Veterans' Benefit
Act suggests that in the Anglo-American legal system, the Protestant ethic deni-
grates the interest of the legitimate benefits claimant. That ethic condemns the
receipt of an economic advantage unless the recipient has given a corresponding
economic advantage in exchange. See Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and
the Constitutional Problems of "Positive" Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183 (1964).
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Courts found that the United States had created claims against itself when
Congress passed the VA legislation. The sovereign power to impose a
condition upon those claims was exercised when Congress, under the
no-review clause, limited the veteran to administrative remedies."I
Recent legislative history demonstrates congressional intent to carry
out the purpose of the no-review clause by means of amendment. In 1958
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals circumvented the no-review
clause in Wellman v. Whittier, 12 a termination of benefits case. That court
found that the no-review clause terminology "claim for benefits" did not
apply to termination of benefits. The consequence was that although the
clause barred judicial review of an original grant of benefits, it did not bar
review of subsequent action regarding the grant. In 1970 Congress re-
sponded to a series of cases that had employed this judicially created
exception to review the Administrator's decisions.' 3 It amended the no-
review clause by eliminating the word "claim" 14 to make it perfectly clear
that the Congress intends to exclude from judicial review all determina-
tions with respect to. . .benefits provided for veterans ... "is
In 1974 the Supreme Court imposed a major limitation upon the
veterans' benefits legislation. In Johnson v. Robisonl Ia veteran challenged
the constitutionality of the statutory provisions that disqualified conscien-
tious objectors from eligibility for education benefits. 17 He argued that this
statutory disqualification violated his constitutional guarantee of religious
11. Milliken v. Gleason, 332 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
1002 (1965); Van Horne v. Hines, 122 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
689 (1941); Steinmasel v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D. 1962); Strong v.
United States, 155 F. Supp. 468 (D. Mass. 1957), appeal dismissed, 356 U.S. 226
(1958). There is a split of authority as to whether the denial of access to the court
system is a violation of due process. Compare Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71
HARV. L. REV. 401 (1958) (some judicial process is mandatory) with Davis, Adminis-
trative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 814 (1966) (judicial process is
not always necessary). See also Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51
MINN. L. REV. 601 (1967) (a continuation of a debate with Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis concerning judicial review of administrative arbitrariness); Davis, Administra-
tive Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1967) (a response
to Berger's attack).
12. 259 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
13. DiSilvestro v. United States, 405 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 964 (1969); Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Thompson v.
Gleason, 317 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also Comment, Judicial Review and the
Governmental Recovery of Veterans' Benefits, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 288 (1969); Note, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1861 (1968.)
14. Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-376, § 8(a), 84 Stat. 790. The
amended statute was applied to preclude judicial review of an award of counsel fees
arising out of a proceeding seeking resumption of terminated benefits. De Rodulfa
v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
15. H.R. REP. No. 91-1166, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 11 (1970).
16. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
17. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1652(a)(1), 101(21), 1661(a), 1651-97 (1970).
[Vol. 42
3
Beedle: Beedle: Administrative Law-Veterans' Benefits-Judicial Review
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
RECENT CASES
freedom and equal protection. The Court held that the no-review clause
did not bar judicial review of the constitutionality of the statute itself.' 8
The court in Plato relied heavily on Robison as authorizing judicial
review.of constitutional questions. 9 However, Plato went beyond Robison.
In Robison the Court had pointed out that it was reviewing the statutory
language only. It stressed that it was not reviewing any policy of the VA.
20
Plato expressly focused its review upon the policy established under the VA
regulations. However, the court was careful to distinguish procedural
policy from substantive policy.2 1 Plato confined its review to the constitu-
tionality of the VA procedural policy of not affording a pretermination
hearing.
The VA procedural policy is found in the regulations and the manner
in which the regulations are applied. The regulations outline a procedural
policy that is ex parte in nature.2 2 They provide for notice to the claimant of
a decision to terminate his benefits. The notice must specify the date the
termination "will be effectuated" and inform the claimant of his right to a
hearing "at any time" upon request.23 The court did not review the con-
stitutionality of these regulations. Providing notice to the claimant of his
right to a hearing on the agency's decision was not constitutionally ques-
tioned. Instead, the court reviewed whether the absence of a pretermina-
tion hearing was unconstitutional. The regulations did not expressly pro-
hibit a pre-termination hearing, they simply did not expressly provide for
such a hearing. Thus, it was not the language of the regulations which was
questioned, but rather the manner in which the regulations were applied.
The VA's manner of applying the regulations was to make an ex parte
decision to terminate a claimant's benefits and then notify him of the
decision. Although the claimant could demand a hearing at any time, the
practical effect of this policy was that the only time the claimant was aware
18. The Court pointed out that the no-review clause did not bar judicial
review because "appellee's constitutional challenge is not to any such decision of the
Administrator, but rather to a decision of Congress ...... 415 U.S. at 367. The
Court appeared to be saying that it had power to review a decision of Congress, but
it did not have power to review whether a decision of an administrator is beyond
statutory or constitutional authority. Thus, the Robison decision can be read as
making the anomalous rule that while Congress is bound by the Constitution, an
administrator, because of the no-review clause, is not. But see St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936) (Congress cannot escape judicial review by
making the findings and conclusions of its legislative agencies" final).
19. "Congress did not intend to bar judicial review of constitutional ques-
tions." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974).
20. Id.
21. "[P]laintiffs do not challenge an 'interpretation or application of a particu-
lar provision of a statute to a particular set of facts . . .' [r]ather plaintiffs seek
constitutional review of a generally applicable procedural policy. Such review is not
barred by the language of § 211(a). Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295,
1303 (D. Md. 1975).
22. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1976).
23. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c), (e) (1976).
1977]
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of a need to request a hearing was after the decision had been made. Even
if he was accorded a hearing prior to the time that the decision took effect,
he still would not have an opportunity to be present at the time the decision
was made. Relying on the leading case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 24 the court held
that the failure to provide an opportunity to be heard at the time of the
decision to terminate violated procedural due process. Whether a pre-
termination hearing is constitutionally required at present is subject to
serious doubt. The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge25 has since held
that a hearing is not constitutionally required prior to terminating social
security disability benefits. However, the significance of Plato lies not in the
product of the court's review, but in the fact of review. Prior to Plato, the
courts had not reviewed VA regulations or procedural policies established
under the regulations.2 6 In deciding to review the agency's procedure for
terminating benefits, the court found it necessary to construe the no-review
clause.
The no-review clause bars judicial review of the decisions of the Ad-
ministrator under any law administered by the VA. Using statutory con-
struction, two possibilities exist for reviewing the agency's procedure of not
allowing a pre-termination hearing. The first possibility focuses upon the
phrase "under any law administered by the VA." The failure to provide a
pre-terminatiofn hearing is a procedural due process issue. It could be said
to arise "under" the Constitution, not under the VA statute. Thus, it would
not be proscribed by the no-review clause.2 7 The court in Plato chose to
utilize the second possibility which focuses upon the word "decisions". The
court found that the "decisions" of the Administrator which were ex-
empted from review under the statute were his determinations "on the
merits." A determination "on the merits," the court said, was the Adminis-
trator's application of a provision of the VA statute to the facts of individu-
al benefits claims. 28 The court in Plato stated that it was not reviewing such
a decision "on the merits," but rather the procedure the Administrator used
to arrive at that decision. In other words, the court was saying that it was
not the substantive decisions of the VA that it was reviewing, but rather it
was the manner in which those decisions were made. Furthermore, if that
manner violated procedural due process, the court had jurisdiction to
review.
24. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25. 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. CH. L. REV. 28 (1976).
26. See Langston v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Because the
plaintiff in Langston failed to present the issue properly, the court did not pass on
the contention that § 211 (a) could not foreclose the court's power to decide whether
the Administrator's procedure complied with due process. See also Note, Judicial
Review of Federal Administrative Decisions Concerning Gratuities, 49 VA. L. REV. 313
(1963).
27. This was the line of reasoning employed by the Court in Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
28. Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295, 1302 (D. Md. 1975).
[Vol. 42
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If this is a correct analysis of the court's reasoning, a second conclusion
regarding the court's jurisdiction under the no-review clause seems war-
ranted. In asserting its power to review the manner but not the substance
of the Administrator's decisions, the court is necessarily assuming a more
fundamental power. The court appears to be adopting the rule that while it
does not have power to review the decisions of the VA, it does have power
to determine whether a particular action is, in fact, a decision at all.
Applying this fundamental power in the context of Plato, the court found
that administrative action which fails to comply with constitutionally re-
quired procedures is not a decision within the meaning of the no-review
clause. Thus, the clause did not prohibit judicial review of administrative
action which violated procedural due process.
Notwithstanding a no-review clause, some courts have allowed actions
against an administrator where he exceeds his statutory authority.2 9 At
least one court has characterized judicial review of an administrator's
actions in excess of his authority as "judicial control," not "judicial re-
view."" ° The distinction is that judicial review refers to a court's examina-
tion of an administrator's decision on the merits, whereas "judicial control"
refers to a court's examination of an administrator's procedure or manner
of arriving at his decision, notwithstanding the fact that an administrator's
decision on the merits may be supported by substantial evidence. A court
has power to reverse and remand if the manner of arriving at the decision
29. Holley v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Siegel v.
United States, 87 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). Accord, Steinmasel v. United States,
202 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D. 1962) (dictum). An agency may not finally decide the
limits of its statutory power; that is a judicial function. Social Security Board v.
Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946). Where the intent of Congress is to preclude judicial
review, limited jurisdiction exists in courts to review actions plainly in excess of
statutory authority. Briscoe v. Levi, 535 F.2d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
30. See Siegel v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). In Siegel, the
plaintiff was a widow of a United States soldier killed in action in Germany. She
sought restitution of widow's death compensation for a two-year period during
which she received no compensation because of misinformation given her by a VA
representative. The representative had incorrectly advised her that she was inelig-
ible for compensation. Relying on this misinformation, she failed to furnish proof
of her marriage within the statute of limitations provided in the VA legislation. The
effect of this was to preclude her from receiving compensation up until the time she
discovered she was actually eligible, reapplied and her claim was approved. The
court found that, notwithstanding the no-review clause, all relief was not precluded.
The facts of the case, if sufficiently alleged, would support a conclusion that the VA
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying plaintiff's claim. The court con-
ceded that it did not have the power to determine the effective date of the award.
However, it did have the power to order a rehearing upon a showing that the
administrative officer acted in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon him in
statute. The court characterized its action as judicial control rather than judicial
review. Judicial control is the function of keeping administrators within their
statutory authority. Where the administrator exceeds his statutory authority courts
have the power to exercise control over his actions to the extent of confining him to
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was procedurally defective. In spite of the availability of the "judicial
control" characterization, the weight of authority has been that the no-
review clause prohibits all actions against the administrator, even ones
where arguably the administrator exceeded his authority under the
statute.
3 1
In the final analysis, a concern more fundamental than legal charac-
terization or statutory construction appears to underlie the court's disposi-
tion of the no-review clause. The separation of powers constitutional man-
date underlies judicial reluctance to interfere with the clause. Under the
Constitution, Congress is empowered to create the lower federal courts.
Having exercised that power, the question is whether Congress can limit
their judicial function by prohibiting review of the actions of adminis-
trators. The teaching of Plato is that where an administrator's action vio.
lates the constitutional guarantee of due process, the courts will intervene
in spite of the no-review clause. 2
NORMA J. BEEDLE
31. Sinlao v. United States, 271 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Hahn v. Gray, 203
F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Steinmasel v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D.
1962). One reason why the judicial control theory has not won widespread accept-
ance is that, once accepted, the no-review clause probably would fall. The govern-
ment would have to argue that administrative action in defiance of statutory
standards is somehow not arbitrary and capricious, and that the no-review clause
continues to bar judicial appraisal of administrative action which, although alleged-
ly illegal, is not arbitrary and capricious.
32. Language in the no-review clause specifying that the "decisions of the
Administrator . . . shall be final and conclusive . . ." is labeled finality language.
Courts have asserted jurisdiction to review constitutional violations in spite of the
finality language of enabling statutes of administrative agencies. The benchmark
for the scope of judicial review of finality language is flagrant constitutional viola-
tion. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969); Fountain v. United States,
427 F.2d 759 (Ct.CI. 1970); Caulfield v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 293
F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Clark v.
Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256,259-60 (1968) in which he indicated that the no-review clause
of the Military Selective Service Act might be disregarded where the Board violated
a registrant's free speech or religious freedom.
[Vol. 42
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